Poland, Ukraine and the West - a Strategic Partnership

The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol.4 No. 3 (12) 2004

Poland’s accession to the European Union has provoked an animated public debate on the benefits and costs of its membership. As regards the benefits of its accession, emphasis is placed primarily on the improved competitiveness of the economy and advantages resulting from the opening of markets. However, little attention is given to the geopolitical context of the EU enlargement and the rolewhich Poland can play in shaping the “EasternDimension” of EU policy. This role could consist of Poland performing the function of advocate for its eastern neighbour in its opening to the West, and protection against the increasingly apparent signs of Russian imperial policy.

In the history of every state there are opportunities which should never be wasted. In becoming a potentially important EU member, Poland should make use of the historic opportunity it is offered. Poland can and even should more actively engage in the process of shaping the Eastern Policy of the EU within the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, the second pillar of the European Union.

This postulate raises a number of questions: Is Ukraine itself determined and consistent in its pro-Western choices? If so, does it see any role for Poland in this process? Does Poland want to be and can it be the advocate of Ukraine in its aspirations for membership in the European Union and NATO? What specifically can Poland do for Ukraine? How can these states overcome their historical prejudices and build a common future? Does the West recognizethe geostrategic importance of Ukraine and does it envision this country within its structures?

Before I attempt to answer these questions, it is worth taking a closer look at the relations between Poland and Ukraine to date and the prospects for further cooperation.

Polish-Ukrainian Relations: History, Present Status, and Future Prospects

Our common history does not help in overcoming stereotypes. Wounds are deep: from the Cossack uprisings in the 17th century which, in essence, were a civil war, to contemporary history and, in particular, the extermination of the Polish population in Volyn in 1943. Poland bears a burden of guilt as well. One should recall primarily the brutal, communist persecutions and forced displacement of the Ukrainian population under the “Wisła” Campaign in 1947. It will be difficult to talk about any true reconciliation as long as the massacre in Volyn is not decisively and unequivocally condemned, not only by the Ukrainian elites, but also by the people of Ukraine; and the “Wisła” Campaign-by the Polish elites and society. At present there is also no shortage of new, unnecessary conflicts, as exemplified by the disputes concerning the opening of the Cemetery of the Young Eagles in Lvov, which have been going on for many years.

Poland and Ukraine are breaking down their prejudices and building their partnership very slowly. Although both countries have declared their will to create a strategic partnership since the early 1990s, in practice the activities aimed at improving mutual relations have experienced “ups and downs”. We can distinguish three major periods in Polish-Ukrainian relations: 1990-1991, when Poland supported and recognised Ukraine’s independence; 1991-1993, which were a period of stagnation in mutual relations; and the recent decade, in which mutual relations have revived slightly. It is worth devoting some attention to each of these periods.

In 1991 Poland was the first country to recognise Ukraine’s independence. This occurred only several months after the famous visit of President George Bush, who awkwardly announced during his stay in Kiev that Ukraine should remain an integral part of the Soviet Union. In 1991 it appeared that Poland’s gesture of recognizing Ukraine’s independence would contribute to a revival of contacts between both  ations. Unfortunately however, the “honeymoon” was relatively brief.

The reason for the deterioration of relations in the years 1991-1993 was the reorientation of Polish foreign policy towards the West and the desire of Poland to integrate with European and Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures. As early as at the beginning of the 1990s Poland decided to withdraw from its former political and military alliances within the Eastern Bloc and to march towards NATO and the EU. Ukraine was not then sufficiently determined to set its course towards the West. Instead, it declared itswill to be a neutral state. This stancewas in a sense understandable given the geopolitical situation in which Ukraine found itself, which was still in a state of flux, and its shaky newly-won independence. In addition, the concept of strategic partnership functioned more at the level of diplomatic relations than at the level of public perception. Therefore, the years 1991-1993 can be characterised as a period in which there was an absence of initiatives on both sides.

Mutual relations revived slightly in 1994 when Ukraine joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program. The participation of Ukraine in this program also contributed to a change in its previous, rather cool, stance towards NATO expansion to the East. Ukraine gradually began to perceive the potential benefits which could result from NATO enlargement. First of all, it was understood that participation in the Partnership for Peace program would have a positive impact on promoting political and economic contacts with the West, and on good neighbourly relations with Poland. Furthermore, in this manner Ukraine was able to become more independent of Russia and thus strengthen its independence as a nation.

It is worth emphasising that the evolution of bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine was also positively affected by the warming up of Ukraine’s relations with the European Union. The first sign of these changes occurred as early as in August 1993,when President Kravchuk signed the decree “On an Intergovernmental Committee on Cooperation with the European Union”. However, due to the uncertain social and political situation at that time it was not possible to build a comprehensive strategy of cooperation with the European Union. Only in 1998 did the Ukrainian authorities begin to state more loudly that membership in the European Union should be one of the main objectives of Ukrainian foreign policy. In  June 1998 President Leonid Kuchma issued a decree “On Ukraine’s Strategy for Integration with the European Union”. In the same year a number of documents were also prepared and issued and many initiatives were taken to adjust Ukrainian legislation gradually to EU requirements. Special attention should be paid to the decree of August 2000 “On the National Council for the Adjustment of the Ukrainian Legal System to the Legal System of the European Union”, and to the decree of September 2000 “On the Program of Ukraine’s Integration with the European Union”. Unlike in Poland however, in the case of Ukraine the objectives of European integration were formulated by a rather narrow group of politicians and were not accompanied by widespread public support and interest.

In Poland the process of adjustment to EU membership requirements was clearly accelerated upon the adoption of the National Strategy for Integration, particularly as regards the harmonization of the legal system,whereas Ukraine did not have the determination and political will to transform its political declarations into real changes in a consistent manner. As long as Ukraine is not fully determined in its pro-European and pro-Atlantic course, it is impossible to hope that the EU or NATO will invite it to join their clubs, or that Poland can become a credible advocate of its pro-Western aspirations. Each party will have to make difficult choices which will shape the future geopolitical structure of our continent. Therefore, it is worth closely examining the respective dilemmas of Poland, Ukraine, and the West.

The Dilemmas of Poland

Since the early 1990s Poland’s foreign and security policies have been focused on membership in NATO and the European Union. At the same time Poland has always intended to maintain good relations with its eastern neighbours. Poland’s strategic policy objective had a specific ideological basis. Following its rejection of the socialist system, based on a “people’s democracy”, centrally planned economy, and “social justice”, Poland found itself in an ideological vacuum. For this reason it very quickly absorbed liberal values, which were an antithesis to “real socialism”. This meant the adoption and acceptance of the foundations of liberal Western civilisation such as democracy, a market economy, and human rights, among which is an inherent basic right to private ownership.

 At the same time the Poles began a new search for their European identity, which was clearly visible in the debate on membership, which was dominated by symbolic language, including phrases such as “the return of Poland to Europe” or “the end of the Yalta system”. The language of the discourse on integration was visible even in the most important national documents, where one could read, for instance, that “In the process of NATO and European Union enlargement the last remnants of the Yalta division of Europe are removed”. Emphasis was placed on the role of the values represented by the civilisations of the West, as well as the fact that Poland would follow the values, ideas, and principles included in the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Treaties. However, it would be wrong to advance the thesis that Poland’s pro-Western aspirations resulted solely from ideological motives. Poland linked ideological reasons with pragmatism based on political calculation and the assumption that membership in NATO and the European Union would serve the Polish national interest by improving its security, accelerating its economic and civil development, and strengthening its role in the international arena. The case of Poland proves that a symbiosis of ideology and pragmatism in international relations is possible.

In relation to the European Union Poland declared its active participation in the development of Security and Defence Policy as a supplement to the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. TheNational Security Strategy declares that “Poland, as a member of the European Union, will actively participate in the mechanism of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. We see it as an opportunity to increase our say in international policy as part of common action of the EU. (…) Our priority will also be to achieve development in the Eastern Dimension of the EU and, at the same time, remain actively involved in EUpolicy as regards other areas.”

Poland can have a significant impact in the shaping of the Eastern Dimension of the European Union. This is possible partly because the European Union itself is short of ideas on what to do with its new eastern neighbours, in particular with Ukraine. On the one hand the European Union, by implementing its priority objectives, i.e. internal reforms, the integration of ten new members, and the commencement another enlargement stage in 2007 which will most likely involve Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia, is not willing to make any political declarations concerning the acceptance of Ukraine. On the other hand, it does not rule out this option.

In such circumstances Poland can play the role of Ukraine’s advocate in the EU structures, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, Poland must first build its own position within the EU, which has been weakened in connection with the war in Iraq and due to the opposition it expressed with regard to portions of the draft European Constitutional Treaty. The process of strengthening Poland’s position in the European Union may last several years. However, Poland should already begin lobbying for Ukrainian membership in the EUandNATOstructures, seek to develop economic cooperation, and support common social, educational, and cultural initiatives and the activity of non-governmental organisations.

In order to exert influence on the shaping of the EasternDimension of European Union Policy, it is important that Poland build its own strategy for acting within the European Union, together with a plan of cooperation with its eastern neighbours. It must present to both the European Union and Ukraine concrete proposals which go beyond the diplomatic language of “good neighbourly relations” and “building a strategic partnership between the two nations”.

Ukraine, on the other hand, must be consistent in its pro-Western orientation and solve its geopolitical dilemmas as soon as possible so that Poland can play the role of Ukraine’s advocate for its membership in the EU and NATO. At the moment such determination is, unfortunately, absent,

The Dilemmas of Ukraine

President Kravchuk once described Poland as the “gate to the West”. The question is whether Poland is prepared for such a role and whether Ukraine still perceives Poland as its gate to the West. Ukraine itself must make the decision whether it will seek guarantees, security, and stabilisation in the European Union and NATO and whether it will treat cooperation with these organisations as a source of its economic development, or whether it wants to rely in this respect on the structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The answer to this question, leaving aside pure political strategy, should be sought in the Ukrainian identity. In Poland the language of the debate over integration itself suggested a strong feeling of European identity, whereas Ukraine is torn between the need to absorb European values and its links with the traditions of the Civilisations of the East. The reasons for this dilemma can be identified with the geopolitical division of Ukraine into the more European West and the East, which is more inclined to tighten its ties with Russia. Such a presentation of the matter is obviously a certain intellectual simplification, but it does roughly reflect the major dilemmas of Ukrainian policy. At this point it is worth emphasising that the reasons for this division run deep, and can be identified in history, mentality, and social ties.

An alternative to the clearly pro-Western course is a desire to reconcile the two extremely different elements, i.e. to establish closer cooperation with Russia as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States while at the same timemaintaining good relations and dialogue within the European structures. The supporters of this bipolar concept of cooperation emphasise the economic, cultural, and social links between Russia and Ukraine, particularly visible in easternUkraine.Although these arguments are not unfounded, the fact is that if Ukraine seriously considers membership in the European Union over the longer perspective, the further pursuit of a bipolar policy will be impossible, among other reasons because it is based on the assumption of the existence of a strong community of interests between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s will to integrate with the European Union. Supporters of the bipolar concept sometimes emphasise the need for a joint march of Ukraine and Russia towards the European structures, but is Russia interested in a variant of European integration? In fact in Russia itself there is no shortage of incentives for regarding the Ukraine as a partner in building common relations with the EU, but a realistic analysis of the situation indicates that the EU would agree to accept Russia more quickly than Russia itself would decide to become an EU member. The policy of President Putin aims rather at the gradual involvement of Ukraine in the network of economic ties with Moscow. This is seen in Putin’s declarations on establishing a free trade zone between Russia and Ukraine, which is particularly in the economic interest of Ukraine. Although President Kuchma has striven for such a solution for a long time, it appears that Russia’s consent to such a project is of a political nature and is aimed at weakening the European aspirations of Ukraine. Thus it can be said that Putin’s policy is very well-thought out and aimed at strengthening the Russian sphere of influence. Russia’s offer is all the more tempting in light of the economic development in Russia, driven primarily by the high prices of energy resources on world markets. Unfortunately at this stage of events the European Union, which is preoccupied with the discussion on the reform of its structures, accession of new members, and disputes over the Constitutional Treaty, is not able to present any concrete membership proposals to Ukraine, which does not aid Ukraine in trying to steer a pro-European course.

Nor is the idea of neutrality, put forward particularly in the early 1990s, an alternative for Ukraine. The historical experiences of this part of Europe demonstrate that it is impossible tomaintain neutrality over the long term. Therefore, Ukraine must make the decision whether it wants to remain in the Russian sphere of influence or to begin its march towards the EUand NATO. This geopolitical dilemma needs to be solved by Ukraine itself as soon as possible.

The Dilemmas of the West

Cooperation within the European and Euro-Atlantic structures does not have to mean that Ukraine will turn its back on Russia. In fact, the West expects Ukraine to maintain friendly relations with Russia.8 In this context the role of Ukraine as a bridge between the West and Russia is interesting. Poland can play the role of a bridge between the West and Ukraine in the European Union and NATO, but it will never be the link between the West and Russia. This is where the geopolitical potential of Ukraine lies.

Therefore the arguments frequently raised by Russia that the potential membership of Ukraine in the European Union or NATO will be directed against the Russian state are not convincing. At best, they would be directed against the imperial tendencies of some politicians, and this subtle difference should be noted. The West, understood as European and Euro-Atlantic structures, is faced with a very serious dilemma. It is trying to decide whether to extend its geopolitical influence to the East while attempting to maintain good relations with Russia, or whether to give in and let Russia gradually assume the status and domination it lost in the region. Zbigniew Brzeziński put it openly that “without independent Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire”. But maintaining geopolitical influence is costly, and the West must be prepared to provide Ukraine with significant assistance in its adaptation to membership in NATO and the European Union. On the other hand “giving in” may be connected with much higher costs, involving an unpredictable situation as well as political and economic instability.

In the case of NATO the helping hand extended to Ukraine was the introduction of the Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and the resulting signature of the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1997. The latter document provides for tightening political and military cooperation via, among other things, exchange of information, training, and joint manoeuvres and military action. This plan also includes the establishment of a Polish-Ukrainian Battalion. Although recently a certain revival can been seen in the relations between NATO and Ukraine in connection with the implementation of the so-called Action Plans, no definite decisions on membership have been taken, for which Ukraine also bears some responsibility.

As for the European Union, since the signature of the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994, a number of documents have been issued and for several years top-level meetings have been held at which “the strategic and unique partnership between Europe and Ukraine” has been emphasised. But one can hardly talk about any major breakthrough.

Even the “Neighbourhood Policy” recently issued by the European Union does not mark any significant breakthrough. This document declares that the objective of this policy is to avoid new divisions in Europe and to give states an opportunity to participate in EU initiatives through deepening political cooperation in security, economic, and cultural policies. At the same time, the neighbourhood strategy clearly emphasises that the objective of such cooperation is not designed to lead to the membership of these states (including Ukraine) in the EU, which they could apply for under Article 49 of the European Treaty. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that an earlier published document of the EU, entitled “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood” clearly indicates that the European Union does not rule out the membership of countries such as Ukraine orMoldova. The EuropeanUnion has also proposed, among other things, easier access to the European markets and a preferential trade policy. It also announced the implementation of so-called Action Plans on an individual basis for each neighbour country. These would include an agenda in individual areas of cooperation for the next three to five years, and would be monitored on a current basis.

Thus although a certain progress in mutual relations can been seen, it is too slow and clear acceleration is missing. An invitation issued to Ukraine for EU membership could constitute such a breakthrough. Unfortunately, in the document “European Neighbourhood Policy” the opportunities for Ukraine’s quick integration with the EU have been wasted. Ukraine’s accession has not been ruled out, but it has been postponed for at least a dozen or so years. Of course no one claims that Ukraine is already prepared for EU membership, but an invitation to negotiations would be a clear political gesture and such a decision would most probably accelerate the pace of necessary changes and give an impetus to economic and political reforms. Instead, the temporary giving-up of Ukraine by the EU may result in much higher costs, an unpredictable situation, and political and economic destabilisation. It may also lead to disappointment on the part of Ukrainian elites and society, and consequently to Ukraine’s turning away from the West, or in the worst case scenario even to its isolation.

Ukraine should certainly not follow in the footsteps of Belarus, where isolation from the West has triggered deplorable economic and political consequences. However, given the uncertain political situation and the forthcoming presidential elections in autumn 2004, no scenario can be ruled out. If Ukraine were to plunge into chaos and anarchy, it would have negative consequences for its western neighbours and also for the entire European Union. The West may have little time left to make its strategic decisions on Ukraine’s potential NATO and EU membership. Later, the dilemma of the West may be simply solved by history.

Building a Strategic Partnership

In order for Poland to play its role it is necessary to strengthen mutual ties and give real meaning to the Strategic Partnership of both countries. Deepening cooperation will be a stabilising factor for the entire region and will contribute to building common security. It is worth noting here that the concept of security needs to be broadly understood. It is becoming increasingly more necessary to distinguish between the concepts of hard and soft security. Poland can build up its soft security, which is not only military security, but also security involving elements of political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation. The conditions for such security involve coordination of actions, consistency, and maintaining the mutual support of both partners by agreement on a common, long-term strategy of cooperation.

If Poland succeeds in building a strategic partnership with Ukraine, the EU will become convinced that Poland can constitute a bridge between the European Union and Ukraine, thanks to which Poland will acquire real impact in the shaping of the Eastern Dimension of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Obstacles and Threats

In the process of building good bilateral relations there are many obstacles and potential threats. For Ukraine, the lack of consistency and determination to carry out its political choices constitutes a real threat. In addition, this country must address the problems of internal division, which contribute to weakening its political, social, and economic potential. Ukraine also suffers from the lack of developed structures of civic society. The economic and political turbulence, the fragmentation of the political scene, and the political crisis involving President Kuchma, which has been dragging on for many years, adversely affect the internal security of the state. Ukraine is threatened with social, political, and economic destabilisation and an escalation of ethnic conflicts, all of which would create conditions conducive to the take-over of control over Ukraine by imperial Russia.

Threats to mutual cooperation are also present on the side of Poland and the European Union. Poland’s membership in the EU has brought about certain restrictions in interpersonal and economic contacts, resulting from, inter alia, the more stringent visa and customs regulations which were forced on Poland by the European Union in an effort to protect its internal market and to tighten its borders to prevent the smuggling of goods and an influx of illegal immigrants from the territories of the former Soviet Union and Asia. While free visas for Ukrainian citizens are one solution alleviating the consequences of the strict new visa requirements, it is nevertheless estimated that the introduction of these requirements will result in a 2/3 decrease in border traffic. It can already be seen that the more stringent visa regulations have contributed to a decline in cross-border trade, which is not only of economic importance but also plays an important role in improving communication between the nations and breaking down stereotypes.

Stereotypes and the ingrained mutual distrust of the societies also constitute a major obstacle. It appears that neither party is free from them and many Poles wrongly conceptualise their Europeanness by manifesting a “civilisational superiority” of the West over their eastern neighbours.

Actors Involved in the Process of Partnership Building

Good will on the part of both nations is required in order to build a strategic partnership.

The policies formulated at the state level should be reflected in concrete activities at the local level. It is therefore necessary to involve non-governmental organisations, local governments, and the mass media in this process. The role of the governments on both sides of the border should be to create favourable conditions for the development of such initiatives and, if possible, to lend them political and financial support.

Cooperation among non-governmental organisations and exchanges of experiences can also affect the development of such institutions. Positive examples of activities at the local level include, for instance, the involvement of the Warsaw School of Social and Political Leaders in building civic society by the organisation of training sessions for activists of non-governmental organisations in Ukraine and training the Ukrainian staff of non-governmental organisations in Poland, as well as active programs popularising Ukrainian culture in Poland. A large contribution in building up community and understanding between the nations was made by the Foundation College of Eastern Europe, established on the initiative of Jan Nowak Jeziorañski. The establishment of the Polish- Ukrainian University on the initiative of Bohdan Osadczuk, an ardent advocate of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, can also be deemed to be a positive sign of cooperation between the two countries. While such initiatives have a limited scope of influence, they are small bricks in the process of building a structure for a real strategic partnership. It is best to build the strategic partnership through educational and scientific exchanges and scholarships and student programs. It may be said that these “grass-roots” contacts are of a much more lasting nature than the diplomatic declarations of political leaders.

At the state level, apart from the dialogue conducted by representatives of the authorities, the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion created under the Partnership for Peace program is an important initiative. These and many other initiatives could give real meaning to the words “strategic partnership”.

Conclusions

The partnership between Poland and Ukraine is of key importance not only for the security and development of both countries, but also for the stability of the entire region. It should be a priority objective to include Ukraine in an Eastern and Central Europe designed to be a zone of security and welfare. Therefore, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is becoming increasingly important. On account of their territory, demographic potential, and geopolitical conditions Poland and Ukraine should constitute key pillars of this zone. The worst case scenario would be another iron curtain separating the NATO countries and the European Union from their eastern neighbours, and sealing the border for fear of an influx of illegal immigrants. Poland, acting jointly with Ukraine, should convince Western Europe that without a strong and integrated Ukraine it is impossible to build a lasting zone of security and welfare. We can only hope that Ukraine will remain consistent in its pro-European and pro-Atlantic aspirations and that Poland will ever more loudly highlight the need for Ukraine’s integration, and will prove successful in its role as Ukraine’s advocate, simultaneously contributing to its influence in building the “Eastern Dimension” of EU policy. The European Union, on the other hand, must understand that a strategy of cooperation and integration with Ukraine is the best solution for Central and Eastern Europe and, consequently, for the entire EU.